2023-07-02 04:55:00
After an era where the Europeans had forgotten the principles of conventional and nuclear deterrence and where they enjoyed a post-traumatic period since the Second World War, Paris must now, because of the war in Ukraine, comprehensively reconfigure its strategic logic in the military. and in terms of energy.
Thus, the Ukrainian conflict has shattered the conviction that existed in Paris, after the Minsk agreements, regarding containing Russian violence, without recognizing Moscow’s priorities and intentions, which included being willing to take up arms. From the ideological point of view, it was also not fully appreciated that Russia has been rebuilding itself in a certain way in ideological opposition to the European Union.
In this novel and traumatic scenario, President Emmanuel Macron has declared: “The time has come for a comprehensive mobilization, to better arm ourselves in all fields, given the historical challenges in a world where competition is confused with confrontation.” The armed conflict in the middle of Europe forces us to resume a logic of collective defense, after decades of the armed forces having been oriented towards operations abroad. This makes it necessary to completely rethink the policy of reservists, working in close contact with civil society, whose attitude continues to reflect rather what Louis-Ferdinand Céline wrote in his work Journey to the Bottom of the Night: “War was everything that was not we understood”. On the other hand, having given up all joint strategic ambitions with London has weakened Europe, and contributed to its never being up to the task of building a conventional deterrent against Russia. Given this, it is not surprising that the US has retaken control of European defense, at times of conflict in the eastern part of the continent.
The war in Ukraine has exposed, in addition to its relative military limitations, the quality of French political/military intelligence, which could not have previously foreseen the fundamental aggressiveness of Vladimir Putin’s policy. This has also been verified in the actions of France in the African Sahel, where two coups in Mali were not anticipated. Given this, American experts such as Walter Russell Smith wonder: France has lost control of the Mediterranean, is withdrawing from Mali, and is it still proposing to help us manage the Indo-Pacific?
The conflict in Ukraine, in turn, represents an enormous challenge for France in the energy field and, as the French expert Thomas Gomart affirms, its “ability to integrate the energy/climate dialectic in its project as a power”. The war has redefined the terms of trade between consumer countries and producer countries, in favor of the latter. The rise in energy prices has contributed to France having a trade deficit of 156 billion euros in 2022, and a level of public debt of 113% of GDP.
Faced with this situation, Paris must define how to position itself within the geopolitics of fossil fuels, and the geopolitics of renewables.
The French energy matrix is based on nuclear (42%), oil (28%) and natural gas (16%). Nuclear power – which accounts for 67% of its electricity production – allows France to have lower carbon emissions than Germany or Great Britain. However, the nuclear park showed cracks at the beginning of the war: 27 of its 56 reactors were not working. In terms of renewable energy –wind, solar–, France is further behind than Berlin or London.
In this context, President Emmanuel Macron recently expressed in Prague that France will continue to diversify its gas supply, importing from Norway and the US, which has already allowed it to reduce its consumption of Russian gas from 35% of the total to just 7 ,5%. And that his three energy priorities will be: sobriety and efficiency in the use of energy, the massive production of renewable energy, and accelerating the production of nuclear energy. At the European Union level, Macron expressed his belief in solidarity and unity in the energy field, stating that we must continue to focus on the strategy of decarbonizing Europe, despite the pressures posed by the war in Ukraine.
Faced with this evolution of the international context, France seems to be in the process of redefining its “grand strategy”, trying to align potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited means. The French “grand strategy” was based on “greatness” since the Second World War -inspired by Charles de Gaulle and continued until Mitterand-, supported by four principles: maintaining a high rank at the world level, the preservation of autonomy from of a considerable attack force –including nuclear–, the centrality of the nation-state, and a critical attitude towards North American hegemony. According to the French expert Thomas Gomart, after the 1990s, there was a radical break, and the “grand strategy” took the form of “liberal engagement and participation.” This would privilege interdependence over independence, the replacement of North American hegemony by a multilateral Western leadership, and adherence to norms and values through the European construction.
Starting in 2022, France has been adopting a strategy that Gomart is inclined to call “strategic and environmental solidarity.” This combines a defensive logic in the military, which implies having reliable allies in the face of military threats, with an offensive logic in the face of environmental challenges, which implies high degrees of international cooperation. This simultaneity of approaches forces Paris to have permanent and deeper political relations with strategic actors, and to take their points of view into account.
In a complex and changing scenario, Paris is facing the challenge described by the French general André Beaufre: “Unlike history, the challenge of strategy is having to act constantly, before having had time to understand everything” . And he is aware that any foreign ambition must be supported by a solid economy and an adequate level of social cohesion to produce lasting effects.
*International analyst.
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